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Abstract 
Current international and European Union environmental policies increasingly promote col-
laborative and participatory decision-making on appropriate and multiple governance levels 
as a means to attain more sustainable policies and a more effective and lasting policy imple-
mentation. The entailed shifts of geographical scale of governance can be exemplified by the 
EU Water Framework Directive in that higher-level policies are devolved not only to the 
member states but to local collaborative decision-making bodies on natural as opposed to ter-
ritorial scales. To date, empirical evidence and theoretical considerations have remained am-
biguous about the environmental outcomes of such modes of governance. At the same time, 
the relationship between multi-level governance and non-state actor involvement remains a 
largely uncharted terrain. Accordingly, a twofold research agenda is mapped out: How does 
public participation work in different governance contexts? And what potential do multi-level 
governance environments have to foster the effectiveness of participatory governance? Draw-
ing on scholarly literature on multi-level governance, policy implementation, public participa-
tion and complex systems, we develop five sets of hypotheses on how the number of policy 
levels and geographical rescaling affect citizen participation, actor interests and policy out-
comes. We present empirical results based on a comparative meta-analysis of 47 case studies 
in environmental governance in North America and the EU, combining qualitative and quanti-
tative methods. 
 
Keywords: Civic participation, multi-level governance, re-scaling, policy implementation, 
institutional fit, meta-analysis, case survey. GoverNat 
 
1.  Introduction 
Environmental policy in Europe and elsewhere has been suffering from a lack of effectiveness 
(Lenschow 1999; CEC 1999; Jordan 2002; Knill & Liefferink 2007). As a response, two key 
strategies have been proposed and partly pursued: (1) to adapt the level and spatial scale of 
governance to that of the environmental problems; and (2) to enhance participation of non-
state, civil society actors in environmental decision-making: 
(1) Environmental problems appear on different and more or less distinct spatial scales. 
Whereas soil contamination on a hazardous waste site may remain a strictly local problem, 
water pollution typically extends the scale of a river basin (and beyond), and climate change 
and biodiversity loss indicate the global level of cause-and-effect-chains. Typically, these 
scales of socio-ecological interlinkages cut across and transcend established administrative 
territorial jurisdictions. In order to effectively respond to environmental problems, it has re-
peatedly been proposed to adapt the scale of governance institutions to that of the environ-
mental issue (Young 2002). Increasingly, functionally specific governance institutions on 
natural spatial scales are being marshalled (Hooghe & Marks 2003). For instance, the Euro-
pean Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) mandates river basins as the relevant unit for 
planning, management and protection of inland waters. To date, a high number of vertical, 
horizontal and, across these, task-specific levels of governance exist in Europe. Thus, envi-
ronmental governance has become a highly complex system of decision points (Meadowcroft 
2002). Yet such systems ‘of multi-level governance’ (Marks 1993; Scharpf 1997; Benz & 
Eberlein 1999) raise their own problems of effectiveness. From the perspective of policy im-
plementation theory, a high number of decision points (‚clearance points’; Pressman & Wil-
davsky 1984 [1973]) and involved actors (veto players Tsebelis 1995) hampers effective pol-
icy delivery. On the other hand, ‘polycentricity’ is regarded as conducive to long-term effec-
tive environmental policy (Ostrom et al. 1961; McGinnis 1999b).  
(2) An important aspect of governance – as opposed to government –, and of multi-level gov-
ernance in particular, is the participation of non-state actors in decision-processes on the dif-
ferent levels of governance (Bache & Flinders 2005; Papadopoulos 2007). In this context, a 
stronger decentralization in policy implementation is advocated. In Europe, next to a mere 
devolution of environmental competences to the member states (Jordan 2002), the active in-
volvement of citizens and local interest groups in policy implementation is increasingly man-
dated. Prominently, the European Commission’s White Paper on Governance (2001) and the 
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report by the Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation (Mandelkern group 2001) represents 
stimulating impulses for the architecture of European governance. In the light of increasing 
policy implementation gaps (Jordan 2002), the document develops criteria for ‘good Euro-
pean governance’ and marshals novel procedures for ‘better regulation’, including extended 
stakeholder consultations . In the field of environmental policy, in particular the inclusion of 
non-stake actors into policy-making achieved prominence thanks to four EU directives push-
ing forward more collaborative forms of governance, for example, the Water Framework Di-
rective (2000/60/EC) and the Public Participation Directive (2003/35/EC). The guidance 
document on public participation in relation to the Water Framework Directive explicitly 
states that “public participation is not an end in itself but a tool to achieve the environmental 
objectives of the directive” (EU 2002, p. 6). Drawing on the academic literature (Steele 2001; 
Pellizzoni 2003), participatory governance is expected to contribute to improving the ‘quality’ 
of decisions by incorporating locally held knowledge and by opening up the political arena for 
environmental interests. Further, it is argued that the inclusion of stakeholders increases the 
acceptance of decisions and thus improves compliance and implementation on the ground 
(Macnaghten & Jacobs 1997; Schenk et al. 2007). Based on these prerequisites, participatory 
and collaborative forms of governance are expected to lead to more effective improvements in 
environmental quality (Newig 2007; Dietz & Stern 2008). 
Neither of these claims regarding the potential effectiveness of multi-level and participatory 
governance has remained undisputed, nor systematically empirically substantiated. It is ar-
gued, for instance, that many societal and environmental problems can be tackled best at 
higher levels of governance, in particular in those cases when local decisions would be taken 
at the expense of third parties because of the dominant interest structures of local actors. This 
is typically expected with environmental problems characterised by increasingly complex 
spatial interrelations of societal and ecological processes (Jordan 2000; Meadowcroft 2002; 
Young et al. 2006). To date, empirical research has yet to provide evidence for the superiority 
of collaborative and multi-level forms of governance in terms of policy effectiveness. Thus it 
has recently been concluded that “a considerable gap remains in our understanding of the ef-
fect of process characteristics and policy outputs on environmental outcomes. (…) We need to 
know which types of decision-making processes – multisectoral collaboration, hierarchical 
planning, command and control regulation, or market-based mechanisms – perform best in 
terms of environmental outcomes” (Koontz & Thomas 2006, p. 118; see also Beierle & Cay-
ford 2002, p. 76). 
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A particular challenge for research (and practice) arises from the fact that the question of 
(civic) participation is invariably connected to the issue of governance level, because partici-
pation is always carried out on a particular – typically local or regional – level (Carter 2005). 
For instance, the perceptions and preferences of citizens and interest groups are presumably 
not neutral regarding the spatial distance to environmental resources or problems, neither is 
the engagement of actors neutral regarding the level of governance (Koontz 1999). Although 
it is plausible to assume that there is unexpected potential and fundamental contradictions 
embedded in the relationship between participation and multi-level governance, this has not 
yet been the subject of scholarly attention (except in Warleigh 2006). 
In an attempt to respond to the outlined research gaps, this paper explores whether and to 
what extent the existence of multiple levels of governance affects the ability of participatory 
decision-making to deliver high quality environmental policy output and to improve imple-
mentation and compliance. To this end, the academic literature on multi-level governance, 
public participation, policy implementation as well as on complex systems is integrated in 
order to develop hypotheses on the relationship between multi-level governance and environ-
mental public involvement (section 2). After a brief discussion of research design (section 3), 
empirical findings based on a meta-analysis of 47 case studies from Northern America and 
Western Europe will be presented (section 4). Section 5 is dedicated to our conclusions and 
the outlook for further research. 
 
2.  Theory and hypotheses 
Multi-level governance (MLG) has been defined as ‘political structures and processes that 
transgress the borders of administrative jurisdictions, aiming to cope with interdependencies 
in societal development and political decision-making which exist among territorial units’ 
(Benz 2006: 95, translation JN). Systems of governance at different levels are typically as-
sumed not to be hierarchical in a chain-of-command sense (Bache & Flinders 2005), but 
rather to comprise formally independent, yet mutually interacting governance levels, which 
can be distributed either ‘vertically’ or ‘horizontally’ (Scharpf 1997; Papadopoulos 2005; 
Paavola 2008). One central assumption of MLG research is that decision-making at different 
levels is increasingly characterised by the participation of non-state actors (Bache & Flinders 
2005). However, little is known on the concrete relationship between participation and the 
multi-layeredness of governance, and how this influences governance effectiveness. 
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Integrating conceptual insights from different strands of scholarly research such as participa-
tion, policy implementation and complex systems research, we find that a number of hypothe-
ses can be put forward regarding the relationship between participatory governance, multi-
level aspects and environmental outcomes. As a guiding hypothesis, we assume quite gener-
ally that the choice of governance scale and level as well as the nature of participation (or its 
absence) in governance decisions affects environmental outcomes. We assume that scale mat-
ters, that participation matters, and that the way in which the two combine is of particular im-
portance. 
1. Participatory versus top-down modes of governance 
Recent participation literature stresses the effectiveness that participation brings to govern-
ance. It is argued that the involvement of local lay knowledge leads to better informed deci-
sions, enables social learning and thus helps to reveal win-win-potential and, overall, fosters 
more sustainable decisions (Yearley et al. 2003; Pellizzoni 2003). Moreover, it is assumed 
that involvement of non-state actors in local decision-making has the potential to open up 
established, non-sustainable actor networks for ecological matters such that participatory de-
cision-making yields outputs with a stronger ecological standard (Dryzek 1997; Smith 2003).  
H 1 a: Participation of non-state actors leads to more ‘ecologically rational’ decisions 
than in top-down modes of governance. 
On the other hand, it is postulated that public involvement effectively responds to implemen-
tation deficits in eco-politics by increasing non-state actors’ acceptance and compliance 
(Macnaghten & Jacobs 1997; Bulkeley & Mol 2003). This is based on the assumption that 
societal opposition will decrease once non-state actors find the preferences and interests they 
voiced in a participatory process represented in the final policy decision. Procedural justice 
research (Lind & Tyler 1988; Tyler 1990) suggests, moreover, that acceptance of public pol-
icy will be high even in cases of substantial disagreement or lack of consideration of non-state 
actor interests as long as the decision-making procedure is regarded fair and legitimate. Tak-
ing the cue from participatory democratic theorists who highlight the legitimacy benefits of 
involvement procedures, scholars assume that collaborative forms of decision-making con-
tribute to higher levels of acceptance and implementation rates (Sabatier et al. 2005). 
H 1 b:  Participation of non-state actors leads to improved compliance with decisions and 
thus better outcomes and impacts in ecological terms than top-down modes of 
governance. 
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2. Spatial relevance of actor interests 
Spatial scale is important regarding actors’ perceptions, interests and problem-solving poten-
tial that vary with their spatial relationship to the relevant environmental goods or problems 
(Schmitter 2002; Hein et al. 2006; Hunsberger & Kenyon 2008). It was observed that citizens 
living in close spatial proximity to a natural resource tend to favour its economic use, whereas 
those living at a greater distance tend to favour resource conservation (Koontz 1999). 
H 2 a:  Citizens living in close spatial proximity to a natural resource tend to favour its 
economic exploitation, whereas those living farther away tend to favour its con-
servation. 
Ecological goals can often be more effectively pursued at higher spatial scales, economic 
goals more effectively at lower spatial scales (Koontz 1999), because local policy-makers 
tend to be subject to higher economic pressure compared with those at higher levels of gov-
ernance (Sabatier 1974). Participatory processes tend to be more professionally managed at 
higher governance levels (Rockloff & Moore 2006), while at the same time specific knowl-
edge regarding local matters decreases.  
H 2 b:  Where decision competences regarding environmental issues are at lower levels of 
governance, a stronger and more influential participation of citizens with eco-
nomic interests can be expected. 
3. Local-scale versus higher-scale decision-making 
Drawing again on Dahl 1994, there are strong arguments to support that collective matters 
(and environmental problems, in particular) can typically be dealt with more effectively on 
wider (e.g. national or supranational) rather than very local scales (Flynn 2000). The central 
argument is that local activities often have distant effects harmful to the environment; in eco-
nomic terms, negative externalities or regional spillovers (Oates 1999). An attempt to solve 
such problems locally presents a ‘collective-action dilemma’ (Hardin 1968; Olson 1969) in 
which the costs ensuing from local environmentally conscious behaviour are greater than the 
benefits experienced at this level – the burden of cost is experienced locally, while the bene-
fits extend further than the local community. Preferences of local participants are thus as-
sumed typically to be less in favour of environmental action. Moreover, local administration 
is assumed to be more susceptible to lobbying (regulatory capture) by economic development 
interests (Demmke 1997). In addition, it is often argued that at higher spatial scales partici-
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pants have a greater competency (Rockloff & Moore 2006), such that more suitable and better 
decisions in ecological terms are taken at this level. 
H 3 a:  The environmental effectiveness of decisions correlates positively with the scale 
of the governance unit. 
On the other hand, many participation scholars hold that – consistent with hypotheses H 1 and 
H 2 – local governance, especially when strongly participatory, is more likely to lead to ecol-
ogically rational outcomes than governance on higher spatial scales (Leach et al. 2002). This 
involves arguments of the usefulness of local lay knowledge (Steele 2001; Pellizzoni 2003; 
Yearley et al. 2003), but also of the capacity of local groups to self-organise and thus better 
ensure social control, acceptance and compliance (Ostrom 2005, 1990; Ostrom et al. 1961): 
H 3 b:  The environmental effectiveness of decisions correlates negatively with the scale 
of the governance unit. 
 
4. Spatial fit between governance scales and natural scales 
A growing body of literature, rooted in the theory of complex adaptive systems, deals with the 
sustainability of coupled social-ecological systems (Adger et al. 2003; Berkes 2002; Armitage 
2008). It studies the interactions and tensions between different scale levels and dimensions. 
A central issue is the (mis)fit between natural and institutional (governance) scales – envi-
ronmental problems and the multiple factors that cause them extend differentially in space and 
exhibit different geographical patterns. These typically cut across territorial governance units, 
involving spillovers in neighboring jurisdictions. If, for instance, air pollution is caused in one 
jurisdiction but extends into others, co-operation between both will be necessary in order to 
resolve the problem at hand. The central conclusion is to improve the spatial fit between gov-
ernance and natural scale dimensions: ‘Overall, the presumption is that the closer the fit be-
tween ecosystems and institutional systems, the better the relevant institutions will perform, at 
least in terms of sustainability’ (Young 2002: 20, referring to Berkes & Folke 1998). In the 
multi-level governance literature these task-specific governance institutions whose geographic 
boundaries relate to natural or cultural geographical boundaries are termed ‘Type II’ systems, 
as opposed to classical territorial jurisdictions which do not cut across each other, which typi-
cally possess an encompassing competency, and which are termed ‘Type I’ MLG systems 
(Hooghe & Marks 2003). 
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H 4 a:  Governance of natural resources on natural scales leads to more ecologically ra-
tional outcomes than governance on territorial scales.  
However, the ‘institutional fit’ approach in H 4 a is not entirely undisputed. Precisely because 
of the overlap of territorial governance units with ‘new’ ecosystem-related Type II govern-
ance scales, coordination of different actors and their identification with common tasks is said 
to be problematic, especially regarding common financing of measures imposed (Ingram 
2008). This raises the question of the horizontal coordination (institutional interplay) between 
different actors, competences and policy fields, such as water resources planning, agriculture 
and industry (Moss 2003; Young 2002). Thus there appears to be a dilemma concerning the 
ecological rationality of governing natural resources on their ‘appropriate’ scale and the re-
sulting transaction costs. 
H 4 b: Governance of natural resources on natural scales leads to less ecologically ra-
tional outcomes than governance on territorial scales. 
As a means to improve both institutional fit and horizontal interplay, participatory processes 
are recommended as ‘tools to help us bridge the discontinuity between geographical and ju-
risdictional boundaries’ and thus arrive at a more sustainable management of natural re-
sources (Delli Priscoli 2004: 225). 
H 4 c:  Participation improves the fit between natural and governance scales and thus im-
proves environmental outcomes. 
5. Polycentricity of the whole (multi-level) governance system 
Finally, regarding the environmental effectiveness of multi-level governance systems, again 
two competing hypotheses can be formulated. 
On the one hand, policy implementation research assumes that complex MLG systems ham-
per governance effectiveness. The involvement of multiple administrative levels and ‘clear-
ance points’ is regarded as inhibitive to policy implementation, because with each level of 
implementation and each further veto player (Tsebelis 1995) the probability of misinterpreta-
tion of the original policy programme, insufficient resources and opposing interests increases 
(Pressman & Wildavsky 1984 [1973]). In normatively more ‘favourable’ terms, the same cir-
cumstance is interpreted by the ‘bottom-up school’ within implementation research as that 
policy implementation itself regularly involves political decisions, and not only a mere tech-
nical transformation of programme into reality (Hill & Hupe 2003). 
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H 5 a:  The more levels and actors involved in a policy implementation process, the lesser 
its effectiveness. 
On the other hand, the systems-oriented approach regards diversity as a stabilising element. A 
multitude of horizontal and vertical, quasi-autonomous decision centres is assumed to be con-
ducive to mediation between centralized and decentralized decision-making and therefore 
better able to adapt to external change and uncertainty by virtue of its flexibility (McGinnis 
1999a), in particular in situations involving numerous causal interactions between multiple 
levels of decision-making (Cash et al. 2006). In this context, the cooperation of different 
stakeholders ‘at different social and ecological scales in multi-level institutions and organiza-
tions’ (Folke 2006) is regarded as crucial. 
H 5 b: A high number of horizontal and vertical, quasi-autonomous decision points is 
better able to adapt to external change than hierarchical modes of governance, 
leading to a more sustainable resource use. 
 
3.  Methodology 
The analysis relies on 47 case studies of participatory environmental governance that were 
conducted between 1970 and 2007 in the United States, Canada and Western Europe. Au-
thored by political scientists, planning scholars, geographers or environmental sociologists, 
these texts were published in scientific journals or edited books and selected from a larger 
pool of case studies on citizen involvement in natural resources management, participatory 
planning and sustainable community programmes. The main selection criterion for the sample 
of this study was the completeness of information provided in the case reports. As a conse-
quence, the sample is not fully representative for all cases in the pool and also does not en-
tirely reflect the variety of all participatory processes undertaken in the case study countries. 
However, the selected sample covers a broad spectrum of political issues, scales, societal con-
texts and types of participation (see Table 1). The majority of case studies, both in the sample 
and the database, report on citizen involvement in Northern America, while fewer texts pro-
vide a detailed account of participation in European environmental management. This distri-
bution attests the long history of collaborative conflict resolution in US eco-politics, which is 
also reflected in a larger share of publications in relevant journals and books. However, statis-
tical tests have established that there are no significant correlation between geographic loca-
tion of the process and dependent and independent variables, indicating that the predominance 
of US cases does not bias the analysis. 
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Case Country  Year  Reference 
301h Water Regulation Case  USA  1977  Burgess et al. 1983 
Aargau Landfill Siting  CH  1993   Renn et al. 1998 
Albemarle Pamlico Estuarine Study  USA  1990  Koontz et al. 2004 
Animas River Stakeholder Group  USA  1998  Koontz et al. 2004 
Ashtabula River Remedial Action Plan  USA  1990  Landre & Knuth 1993 
Bay of Quinte Remedial Action Plan  CA  1988  Landre & Knuth 1993 
Belmont Open Space Controversy  USA   1998   Layzer 2002 
Brayton Point Coal Conversion  USA  1977  Burgess & Smith 1983 
Chiwaukee Prairie Spatial Planning Case  USA  1983  Haygood 1995 
Cold Lake Large-Scale Bitumen Extraction  CA   1978   Elder 1982 
Collingwood Harbour Remedial Action Plan  CA  1990  Krantzberg 1996  
Colorado Grand Canyon River Management Plan  USA  2001  Orton 2005 
Colstrip Power Plant Mediation  USA   1978   Sullivan 1983 
East Everglades Planning Study  USA  1986  Abrams et al. 1995 
Foothills Water Management Case  USA  1976  Burgess 1983 
Frankfurt Airport Airstrip Extension  D   1999   Geis 2005 
Holston River Chemical Plant Mediation  USA   1974   Jaegerman 1983 
Homestake Mining Case  USA  1980  Watson & Danielson 1983 
Hudson River Power Station Settlement  USA  1980  Talbot 1984 
Idaho Wilderness Controversy  USA  1990  Baird et al. 1995 
Inland Northwest Field Burning Summit  USA   1990   Mangerich & Luton 1995 
Interstate 90 Extension  USA  1976  Talbot 1984 
Jackson Sewage Treatment Plant  USA   1978   Hill 1983 
Lübeck Waste Management Proposal  D   1995   Wiedemann et al. 1995 
Maine Radioactive Waste Citizen Advisory Group  USA  1990  Clary & Hornney 1995 
Maine Transportation Policy Case  USA  1992  Bogdonoff 1995 
Milwaukee Estuary Remedial Action Plan  USA  1991  Kaemmerer et al. 1992 
Münchehagen Hazardous Waste Siting  D   1992   Striegnitz 1997 
Neuss Waste Management Plan  D  1993  Fietkau & Weidner 1998 
Pig’s Eye Mississippi River and Wetlands Case  USA  1980  Nelson 1990a 
Portage Island Park Management Case  USA   1979   Talbot 1984 
Portland General Electric  USA  1980  Mogen 1986 
Sand Lakes Quiet Area Oil Drilling Negotiation  USA  1981  Nelson 1990b 
Sandspit Harbour Mediation  CA  1992  Sigurdson 1998 
San Juan National Forest Mediation  USA   1983   Tableman 1990 
Snoqualmie River Flood Protection Mediation  USA   1974   Dembart & Kwartler 1980 
Spey River Basin Management Plan  UK  2001  Blackstock & Richards 2007 
Spreewald Riparian Land Project  D  2002  Baranek & Günther 2005 
Sugarbush Water Withdrawal Mediation  USA  1992  Fitzhugh & Dozier 1996 
Swan Lake Hydroelectric Powerplant Conflict  USA  1979  Talbot 1984 
Three Rivers Watershed  USA  1972  Mazmanian 1979 
Umatilla Basin Mediation  USA  1992  Neuman 1996 
Upper Narragansett Bay Waste Water Treatment  USA  1996  Burroughs 1999 
Wildcat and San Pablo Creek Flood Management  USA  1972  Mazmanian 1979 
Winfield Locks Toxic Waste Case  USA  1992  Langton 1996 
Wisconsin Groundwater Commission  USA  1982  Edgar 1990 
Yukon Wolf Management Team  USA   1992   Todd 2002 
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Traditionally, empirical research on participatory governance draws on conducting single or 
multiple case studies (small N). While this allows a qualitative, in-depth understanding of 
participatory decision-making, the obvious disadvantage lies in the lack of generalisability in 
the face of a multitude of different procedures as well as societal and environmental contexts 
(Ragin & Sonnett 2005). While classic works of comparative research (Lijphart 1971) signifi-
cantly contributed to setting up most-similar or most-different research designs and, thus, to 
isolating causal factors, they keep relying on the analysis of a small number of cases only. 
While the comparative method has brought excellent research in many fields of interest, we 
maintain that in participation research, due to the large number of potential influencial factors, 
the study of a large number of cases (large N) represents a promising alternative based on 
replicable experiments and quantitative statistical analysis. For reasons of resources, however, 
these are only possible under highly controlled contexts and only for a limited set of (partici-
patory) mechanisms (Mahoney 2007). One traditional way to integrate the knowledge of 
many empirical studies is to conduct reviews. However, reviews rely strongly on the subjec-
tive judgements of the reviewer and are seldom performed in a transparent or replicable way. 
Hundreds of case studies on participatory environmental decisions, many of which provide 
information on environmental impacts, present a rich, yet extremely scattered and thus unex-
ploited source of empirical data. As a method to integrate qualitative case-oriented research in 
a transparent manner, the proposed project will use the case survey method (Lucas 1974; Yin 
& Heald 1975; Larsson 1993), combining qualitative and quantitative techniques. The basic 
idea is to draw on existing and published case study reports, following the procedure proposed 
by Larsson (1993: 1516-7): “(1) Select a group of existing case studies relevant to the chosen 
research questions; (2) design a coding scheme for the systematic conversion of the qualita-
tive case descriptions into quantified variables; (3) use multiple raters to code the cases and 
measure their interrater reliability, and (4) statistically analyze the data”. Thus, case surveys 
draw on the richness of the case material, on different researchers and research designs. Case 
surveys are particularly useful when case studies dominate the area of research, when a broad 
range of conditions is of interest and when an experimental design is impossible (Larsson 
1993), all of which applies to the proposed project. The method overcomes the major draw-
back of single case studies, namely their inability to generalise from their respective context. 
Case surveys thus combine the virtues of idiographic (case-based) and nomothetic (cross-
case) research. 
Using existing case studies as empirical material, the authors applied a detailed coding 
scheme in order to extract relevant information and subsequently conducted statistical data 
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analysis. To this end, a conceptual framework was developed including several dozen vari-
ables on the context, the process, and the outcomes of (participatory) environmental decision-
making. Based on this framework, a coding scheme was elaborated and, after a careful read-
ing of all case studies, used for coding most of the variables on a five-point semi-quantitative 
scale into an MS-Access database. In order to maintain intercoder reliability when interpreting 
data, the first dozen of cases were read by at least two coders. 77 per cent of these codes were 
identical, whereas 23 per cent were different, in which case the arithmetic mean was calcu-
lated. In total, the case studies provided information on 86 per cent of all variables. Finally, 
we calculated correlation coefficients among variables. As many variables turned out not to 
be normally distributed, we used Spearman’s rho. For statistical analysis, we aggregated some 
of the original variables, e.g. by defining the new variable ‘actor goals’ as the arithmetic mean 
of all individual actor goals. 
 
4.  Empirical findings 
In this section we will put the causal hypotheses discussed in section 2 to empirical test. At 
first, we analyse the extent to which public participation in decision-making improves the 
quality of policies and also their implementation. Secondly, we explore the influence of mul-
tiple levels of governance as well as spatial scales on environmental policy effectiveness. 
 
1. Participatory versus top-down modes of governance 
H 1 a:  Participation of non-state actors leads to more ‘ecologically rational’ decisions 
than top-down modes of governance. 
In Section 2 we discussed a number of possible causal factors that could affect the quality of 
environmental decisions. In order to determine whether participation really makes a differ-
ence as opposed to hierarchical decision-making, we compared participatory policy outputs to 
hypothetical top-down scenarios. The latter were based on the position held by the competent 
authority prior to or in the public involvement process.  
According to our analysis, interests and political goals of state and non-state actors appear to 
be the most important causal factors explaining participatory policy outputs (mean actor goals 
correlate with r = .84 with r < .001. It is thus reasonable to assume that actor goals contribute 
as much to increases or decreases in environmental policy outputs. One ‘negative’ example 
are public authorities such as the US EPA, whose core agency goal is to reduce pollution and 
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improve environmental conditions, organise public involvement processes. For example, de-
liberations with agencies on a state-level or with non-state actors that do not share the US 
EPA’s high ecological aspirations or whose political agenda is even opposed to environmental 
protection often lead to a watering down of agency proposals. Collaborative agreements there-
fore often represent a compromise between competing interests rather than a collective search 
for ecologically optimal solutions. A striking example is the Spreewald public involvement in 
Eastern Germany where local actors from forestry, fishery, agriculture and tourism in a public 
engagement process opposed strict measures concerning sustainable land use and water man-
agement in order to keep revenues high. However, other cases demonstrate that local actors 
can form a coalition with environmental protection agencies once they perceive their health 
and personal well-being to be in danger. The Colstrip power plant case gives evidence of how 
a tribe of Native Americans opposed modernisation of a nearby power plant on health 
grounds. In a public consultation process, they enforced additional air quality monitoring and 
protective measures as a precondition for the extension of the plant.  
We also found evidence for environmentally beneficial impacts of direct face-to-face interac-
tions (r = .37 with p < .05). At the same time, however, our calculations suggest that there is a 
negative correlation between two-way information flow in public participation and environ-
mental output quality (r = -.31, p < .05). It appears that our case study sample contains a large 
number of studies reporting on involvement processes with non-state actors that are rather 
critical to stringent environmental regulation. In these cases, two-way communication chan-
nels open up opportunities for influence that are not always for the benefit of environmental 
protection. At the same time, no correlations between social learning and the quality of envi-
ronmental decisions could be observed. 
In sum, it appears that H1a cannot fully be confirmed since the causal relationships motivat-
ing the hypothesis vary to a large extent with regard to their relative importance and, what’s 
more, can both support or prevent improvementsof environmental outputs. While participa-
tion is indeed able to open up networks for ‘green’ preferences, this effect is more than com-
pensated by the possibility of local development interests to prevail. Our analysis also sug-
gests that the involvement of non-state actors does not significantly increase the utility of lo-
cal knowledge and the potential of social learning for achieving more sustainable outputs.  
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H 1 b:  Participation of non-state actors leads to improved compliance with decisions 
and thus better outcomes and impacts in ecological terms than top-down modes 
of governance. GoverNat 
According to the academic literature, public participation contributes to improved compliance 
and policy implementation. This is due to the enhanced consideration of non-state actor inter-
ests in policy decisions and also due to acceptance gains based on procedural justice mecha-
nisms. Our quantitative analyses suggest that, on the one hand, involvement procedures in-
crease acceptance of public decisions and that, on the other hand, acceptance is a major pre-
condition for compliance and a swifter implementation. In accordance with the theory, in-
creased acceptance can mainly be attributed to consideration of the positions held by non-state 
actors, while other significant correlations could not be identified. 
These findings can be illustrated by the Holston River case, which illustrates how collabora-
tive decision-making between the US EPA and a large chemical plant contributed to improved 
implementation of water quality standards. Although the final agreement was, from an eco-
logical point of view, less stringent than demanded by environmental movements, involve-
ment of the business community helped to avoid time-consuming court trials and swiftly al-
lowed water quality standards to be put into practice. In light of the dilution of environmental 
stringency aspect discussed above, it can be hypothesised that tricky disputes between envi-
ronmental agencies and powerful economic actors can be resolved and policies more easily 
implemented when state agencies are willing to compromise. However, some studies reported 
cases of environmental public participation that experienced delayed implementation of col-
laboratively made decisions. More often than not this was the case when one or more parties 
perceived the process to be unfair or were deliberately excluded, as the Albemarle-Pamlico 
estuarine management case suggests. 
 
2. Spatial relevance of actor interests 
H 2 a:  Citizens living in close spatial proximity to a natural resource tend to favour its 
economic exploitation, whereas those living farther away tend to favour its 
conservation. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we coded the geographic scale of the participatory process as 
an indicator of the proximity of non-state actors to the environmental problem at hand and 
examine this against the actor positions held. According to our analysis, there is no statisti-
cally significant correlation between the scale of participatory governance and interests voiced 
in the process, refuting the hypothesis. A closer look into the case studies, however, reveals 
that actor interests are to a considerable extent dependent on general economic trends in the 
local community and the broader region. The hypothesis, therefore, requires further refine-
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ment and should allow for flexibility with regard to resolving the trade-off between economic 
development and environmental protection in certain policy contexts.  
For example, in the Umatilla Basin mediation the opposing interests of local and non-local 
actors can be observed in one and the same case. In the 1970s, fishermen, farmers and envi-
ronmentalists discussed whether rivers in Oregon should be diverted for the benefit of local 
agriculture and at the expense of fisheries. While local actors mainly pursued their economic 
well-being during the negotiations, it was external environmental activists who effectively 
defended ecological values. However, public participation in the remediation of the Great 
Lakes gave evidence that economy and ecology can turn out to be surprising bedfellows. 
Based on a bilateral agreement between Canada and the US, the serious pollution problems of 
this singular aquatic environment were to be resolved in a number of local participatory proc-
esses that were closely tied to supranational negotiations. In the Ashtabula River and Colling-
wood Harbour cases, local actors were willing to improve environmental conditions as this 
would support economic development in an industrially deprived region, e.g. in the fishery or 
touristic sector. 
H 2 b: Where decision competences regarding environmental issues are on lower lev-
els of governance, a stronger and more influential participation of citizens with 
economic interests can be expected. 
In our analysis, we coded and tested correlations between actor interests, willingness to par-
ticipate in collaborative decision-making and also scale of governance. No correlation be-
tween governance scale and the mean of actor interests and participation tendency is found. 
However, a slightly negative yet statistically not significant correlation between regulatory 
scale and actor influences is revealed. Based on in-depth study of the qualitative case studies, 
we found indeed evidence sustaining the hypothesis in a number of cases. However, many 
other policy contexts and involvement processes are characterised by complex factorial rela-
tionships that are not accounted for in the hypothesis. 
In Florida’s East Everglades, park managers and environmentalists were in conflict with local 
farmers who increasingly withdrew water to irrigate their fields at the expense of a nationally 
protected and ecologically valuable marshland. The mediation resulted in a compromise 
which has to be interpreted as a success for local agriculture, taking into account the strong 
legal statute of the National Park. The main reasons behind the compromise were concerns 
regarding the socioeconomic wellbeing of the region. In other cases, however, local economic 
interests failed to have a major impact on a participatory decision as a result of strategic mis-
16 of 26 GoverNat 
takes, as the Pig’s Eye case illustrates, where an economically promising dredging project in 
Minnesota could not be realised despite that it also had the support of local politicians. This 
was because the dominant business coalition felt, thanks to its political and economic power, 
unwilling to continue a public involvement exercise and to compromise in favour of environ-
mental interests. Instead, they preferred to fight their way through the courts and lost – to the 
advantage of members of the environmental movement. 
 
3. Local-scale versus higher-scale decision-making 
H 3 a:  The  environmental  effectiveness of decisions correlates positively with the 
scale of the governance unit. 
H  3  b: The environmental effectiveness of decisions correlates negatively with the 
scale of the governance unit. 
These two hypotheses were put to the test by looking for correlations between outcome-
oriented variables and both scale of the participatory process and scale of the competent au-
thority. In our analysis, we were unable to identify any positive or negative correlation be-
tween these factors. This could be explained by the fact that both hypothetical effects, the 
gains of group learning and social capital on the one hand and a profound interest in a func-
tioning local economy on the other, even each other out. However, within the scope of this 
paper it was not possible to test this newly developed assumption. Alternatively, it can be 
conceived that different subsets of cases display either one of the hypotheses, such that the 
dataset as a whole does not display any correlation. If this is true, then this would call for con-
text variables to be found that determine the case subsets. Again, this is a challenge for future 
research. Nevertheless, the findings relating to hypothesis 2 suggest that the geographical dis-
tribution of actor interests might provide a starting point to further understand the effects of 
policy scale on policy decisions in environmental governance. 
 
4. Spatial fit between governance scales and natural scales 
H 4 a: Governance of natural resources on natural scales leads to more ecologically 
rational outcomes than governance on territorial scales.  
H 4 b: Governance of natural resources on natural scales leads to less ecologically ra-
tional outcomes than governance on territorial scales. 
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As a rough indicator of spatial fit, we calculated the absolute value of the difference between 
the geographical scale of the environmental problem and the geographical scale of the partici-
pation process as well as the difference between problem scale and scale of the leading au-
thority’s jurisdiction. However, there is no denying that in particular those cases with a natu-
ral scale larger than the regulation scale are of interest, because this arrangement implies ei-
ther collaboration between authorities of different jurisdictions or that the misfit has been ig-
nored at the expense of the environment. According to our analysis and contrary to theory, 
however, neither positive nor negative correlations could be identified. The main reason to 
account for this finding appears that in the vast majority of analysed cases, the governance 
scale indeed matches or extends the natural (ecological problem) scale; only in four out of 47 
cases the natural scale actually exceeded the governance scale. Methodologically, a consid-
erably larger sample would have to be studied in order to provide any significant results for 
this theses. On the other hand, our analysis does show that spatial misfit appears to be a less 
sailient issue than the literature has been assuming. 
H 4 c: Participation improves the fit between natural and governance scales and thus 
improves environmental outcomes. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we checked for cases where a participatory process was used 
as a means to match governance scale with the natural boundaries of the policy problem at 
hand by involving a number of state or non-state actors from regions geographically much 
more remote than the competent authority. In our sample, we have only four cases that match 
these criteria so that statistical analysis was inappropriate. A qualitative assessment did give 
evidence for significant impacts on environmental outputs and outcomes resulting from re-
scaling efforts. In the Foothills case, where in order to guarantee water supply for the city of 
Denver construction of an ecologically inferior dam was debated, collaborative governance 
contributed to achievement of an identical match between the natural scale and scale of gov-
ernance. However, ecological improvements could not be observed as a result of the re-
scaling. On the contrary, the large number of state agencies in different sectors and at differ-
ent policy levels increased the number of different positions held and represented a major 
handicap with regard to finding common ground. Apparently, rescaling by means of participa-
tory processes appears to be able to achieve identity of scale but also can lead to involvement 
of actors who do not necessarily share ecological goals. This is not only the case with regard 
to non-state actors; public agencies entrusted with tasks other than environmental protection 
may be as obstinate as business or agriculture. 
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5. Polycentricity of the whole (multilevel) governance system 
H 5 a: The more levels and actors involved in a policy implementation process the 
lesser its effectiveness. 
H 5 b: A large number of horizontal and vertical, quasi-autonomous decision points is 
better able to adapt to external change than hierarchical modes of governance, 
leading to  more sustainable resource use. 
These two contradictory hypotheses have been tested by coding and checking for correlations 
between the number of implementing agencies participating, the number of policy levels in-
volved and policy outcome variables. Our findings suggest that the number of governance 
levels involved strongly correlates with environmental output quality (r = 0.40 with p< .01), 
while the number of agencies shows a slightly weaker, but still clear correlation to the quality 
of policy outputs (r = 0.35 with p < .05). 
Striking examples of improvements in environmental policy as a result of decision-making on 
multiple levels can be witnessed in the Great Lakes water management regime. The case stud-
ies on remedial action planning at Ashtabula River, the Bay of Quinte and Collingwood Har-
bour all demonstrate that the interaction between local, regional and supranational actors con-
tributed to a shared understanding of the problems at hand, a coherent set of measures as well 
as provision of the necessary resources to secure swift policy implementation. Furthermore, 
participatory processes in a multi-level governance context often seem to be characterised by 
hierarchically-set policy goals. Thanks to participation of a number of different actors, in par-
ticular higher level agencies, compliance with these policy goals is assured. However, this is 
not to say that hypothesis H5a has been refuted. In fact, this hypothesis was initially elabo-
rated in relation to a top-down policy process with a sequential implementation chain. Imple-
menting agencies often choose to delay implementation on substantive grounds or fail to 
comply due to resource problems. In participatory decision-making, agencies potentially im-
posing delays in implementation are under much greater pressure to justify these, in particular 
to non-state actors. Also, resource scarcities and other anticipated causes of delay can be ad-
dressed earlier. 
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5.  Summary and outlook 
Participatory and multi-level, scale-adapted governance are current responses to lacking effec-
tiveness of environmental policy in Europe and other modern democracies. Scholarly litera-
ture has remained sparse and ambiguous about the empirical effects of these modes of gov-
ernance. In particular, the relation between public participation on the one hand and multi-
level governance and re-scaling on the other hand as well as its environmental effects have 
barely been treated. This paper aimed to address the issue of the environmental effectiveness 
of participatory and multi-level governance both conceptually and empirically. To this end, 
five sets of hypotheses were developed, drawing on scholarly literature on multi-level govern-
ance, policy implementation, public participation and complex systems. Hypotheses relate to 
participatory versus top-down modes of governance; the spatial relevance of actor interests; 
local-scale versus higher-scale decision-making; the spatial fit (or misfit) between natural 
scales and governance scales; and to the polycentricity of whole (multi-level) governance 
systems. Reflecting different assumptions in the respective fields of research, some of the 
hypotheses contradict each other, putting forward competing claims. 
In order to put these claims to an empirical test, we used a comparative meta-analysis of 47 
case studies on environmental decision-making in North America and Europe, which is part 
of a larger ongoing research project (Newig & Fritsch 2008; Fritsch & Newig 2009, in press). 
On the quantitative side, we calculated correlations between relevant variables; on the qualita-
tive side, we searched the case material for convincing evidence of causal processes that sus-
tain or refute the hypotheses. Almost all processes described in the literature could be found 
in some of the analysed case studies, which indicates that scholarly work in the field provides 
meaningful assumptions regarding the effectiveness of participatory and multi-level govern-
ance. However, only two sets of hypotheses yielded significant statistical material: Regarding 
hypotheses 1a/b, more than any other variable the environmental preferences of the involved 
actors determine the environmental outputs (and outcomes) of decision-making. Moreover, 
we found that face-to-face, but not mere two-way communication appears to positively influ-
ence the ecological standard of decisions. Regarding hypotheses 5a/b, our analysis suggests 
that a highly polycentric governance system comprising many agencies and levels of govern-
ance yields higher environmental outputs than rather monocentric governance. 
Our findings suggest that further research is needed in order to understand the specific rela-
tionship between multi-level governance and public participation in environmental govern-
ance: 
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In light of our analyses it can, firstly, be assumed that many hypotheses articulated in the lit-
erature need further refinement with regard to contextualisation. Some of the approaches 
tested appear to be sometimes-true approaches while others could be confirmed to a large 
extent, but in-depth analysis of case studies reveals that their underlying causal relationships 
were different or more complex than predicted by theory. Further research will have to draw 
on a more comprehensive comparison of empirical material in order to yield a sufficient num-
ber of instances on particular participatory and multi-level aspects. This includes a broad con-
trol of third variables and the development of specific conditions under which certain ap-
proaches will have explanatory power. 
Controlling for third variables as a precondition for rigorous in-depth case studies implies, 
secondly, that small-N research designs be paralleled by large-N qualitative studies. A higher 
number of cases might contribute to isolating these causal factors that explain aspects of par-
ticipatory multi-level governance in a majority of cases from those that appear to be relevant 
in specific situations only. 
Studies focussing on the relationship between multi-level governance and public participation 
are scarce and theoretical approaches underdeveloped. We argue, thirdly, that future research 
should include a broader variety of case studies, in particular with regard to their effectiveness 
and achievement of preset goals. There is no denial that public participation can contribute to 
deliver effective, legitimate and efficient environmental policies in a multi-level context. 
However, we need to better understand which contextual or process factors make best-
practice cases so good in order to successfully learn from them. Comparisons with problem-
atic, complex or failed cases can help to achieve that goal. 
Finally, we hope that our conceptual considerations and initial empirical findings will stimu-
late fellow researchers to join the effort to better understand the complex relations between 
participatory, multi-level and scale-adapted governance and the effectiveness of environ-
mental policy. 
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